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A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE:
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
HowARD L. KRoNGowt

ABSTRACT

This article explores some of the differences between the common law
and civilian legal systems with respect to the admission of relevant
evidence in criminal trials. Two types of evidentiary barriers to admission are considered: barriers to the admission of evidence that are
believed to impede the fact-finding process, and barriers to admission
imposed for reasons extraneous to the fact-finding process. The former
are explored through a comparative analysis of the admission and use
of derivative (hearsay) evidence. The latter are explored through a
discussion of the exclusionary mechanisms available for evidence obtained as a result of improper searches and seizures in jive countries:
England, Canada, and the United States (from the common law tradition), and France and Germany (from the civil law tradition). This
article contends that the dangers of reliance on derivative evidence are
generally guarded against in both legal systems, although it is the
structure and functioning of civilian courts, rather than formal rules of
evidence, that have this effect in civil law jurisdictions. This article also
contends that, unlike the treatment of derivative evidence, the mechanisms for excluding evidence obtained as a result ofan improper search
and seizure are not closely tied to the legal system in use in a jurisdiction, but rather to other aspects of a country's legal and constitutional
structure.

t Howard L. Krongold, B.A. (Hons.), is a second-year student at Dalhousie Law School. The
author wishes to thank Professor Bruce Archibald of Dalhousie Law School for his advice and
encouragement.
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I. INTRODUCTION

All fonnal systems for the adjudication of criminal offences involve the
development of what can be called a "truth narrative," 1 that is, a story
about the events in question that is accepted by the adjudicator(s) as
reflecting fact for the purposes of the proceeding. It is on the basis of this
narrative that the case before a tribunal is usually disposed. While
numerous arguments can be made about the possibility of constructing
an objectively accurate truth narrative, the development of a narrative
that purports to reflect the truth is undoubtedly at the core of formal
adjudication in modern legal systems, especially where the case concerns criminal liability.
With the exception of certain facts for which proof is not required for example, in the common law world in the case of judicial notice 2 or
conceded facts 3 the truth narrative is developed through evidence. For
efficiency, and to guard against the confusion of issues, evidence is
limited to that information which is relevant to a fact in issue, i.e.
information that contributes to the truth narrative by tending to establish
that a fact in issue is more or less likely to have occurred. 4
The bulk of the work of an adjudicative body in criminal trials
involves the resolution of contentious facts. Insofar as evidence is the
means by which these facts are resolved by contributing to the development of the truth narrative, it is perhaps initially surprising that various
rules exist to exclude evidence which is logically probative to a fact in
issue. This paper will explore two of these exclusionary tendencies in
the common law and civil law.

In some cases it might be more accurate to describe the development of truth narratives; for
example, the common law does not demand that jurors in a judge and jury trial all accept the
same version of the facts, so long as each accepts a version sutlicient to establish the guilt of
the accused: see i11fi·a note 7.
2
See J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman, & A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d. ed.
(Toronto: Butterwo1ihs, 1999) at 1055 [Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant]. Note that the characteristics of the common law criminal trial will ollen refer to Canadian authorities as examples
of the common law approach.
3
Ibid. at I 054-1055; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 655.
4
See J.W. Strong, ed., McCormick 011 Evidence, 5th ed., vol. 1 (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing:, 1999) at 636-637 [McCormick 011 Evidence - vol. I].
1
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Following the analytical approach outlined by Damaska5 I will
accept for the purposes of this paper that two different categories of
exclusionary rules exist for relevant evidence: i) rules excluding evidence which it is believed would tend to impede the fact-finding process, and ii) rules excluding evidence for reasons unrelated to the
evidence's truth-finding value. In regard to the former kind of exclusion, I will specifically consider the treatment of hearsay evidence (as it
is known in the common law world). In regard to the latter kind of
exclusion I will consider the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result
of illegal searches and seizures.
While it is arguably true that there is something to be learned from
other traditions with regard to the efficacy of the truth finding process, I
will not enter into that debate in this paper. I am prevented from
pursuing that kind of analysis by the lack of any universally acceptable
objective criteria or process for determining objective truth to which one
can compare the results attainable under each system. The legal method
is the nearest method we have for making determinations about truth (at
least on a societal basis); to adopt any other method (for example, a
more "scientific" approach) would merely shift the point of contention.
I feel obliged to note that this paper relies much more heavily on
secondary sources than is preferable. Unfortunately, the nature of comparative legal analysis is that the scope is, of necessity, broad, and as a
result, the potential primary sources are practically innumerable. Secondary sources are necessary in this type of analysis to overcome the
problems of language and the number of potentially relevant primary
materials, to say nothing of issues of accessibility to foreign primary
texts. I hope that my broad conceptual approach to understanding the
differences in evidentiary rules and practices will ensure that this analysis is valuable, notwithstanding the inevitable inaccuracies that occur
when examining sources which are themselves synthetic in their approach and unavoidably out of date.
Finally, I must note that this paper will be addressing only the
exclusion of relevant evidence, without undertaking any serious analysis of what "relevance" means. As noted above, under common law
M. Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure:
A Comparative Study" (1973), 121 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 506 at 513 [Damaska, ··Evidentiary
Barriers"].

5
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systems evidence is relevant if it has the tendency to increase or decrease the probability of a fact in issue. The materials I canvassed do not
suggest there are significant differences between the civil law and
common law when assessing relevance. Nonetheless, it should be noted
the scope of this paper is limited in this regard. Further, the basic
threshold issue ofrelevance is presumed in the analyses below.

II.

THE ADJUDICATIVE CONTEXT OF CIVILIAN AND COMMON

LAW COURTS: STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES

An appreciation of the basic structure and functioning of the factfinding processes in common law and civil law jurisdictions is integral
to understanding the evidentiary exclusionary rules of each system. This
structure and functioning has shaped the rules of evidence; understanding the adjudicative bodies dominant in each system is invaluable to
assist the foreigner in understanding the admissibility of evidence.
In common law jurisdictions, evidence law has developed around
the judge and jury model of adjudication. In this model the judge alone
decides questions of law, while a lay jury of twelve is charged with
making factual determinations and deciding whether the guilt of the
accused has been proven. 6 While the rules of evidence are, at least
theoretically, applied in the same way when a judge sits alone, the laws
of evidence are tailored to fit the jury trial.
While the jury in a judge and jury trial is referred to as the "finder of
fact," it is appropriate to distinguish the activity of the jury as finder of
fact from a judge as finder of fact in judge-alone trials. Unlike judgealone trials, where the judge makes determinations about the facts of the
case and then considers whether the facts accepted establish the guilt of
the accused, jurors are not required to make the same findings of fact to
convict an accused. While each juror must be convinced of the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not necessary that they
agree on what facts have been proven, provided each juror accepts a

6

Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1997) at
436-437 [Quigley].
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version of the facts that sufficiently establishes the elements of the
offence. 7
The nexus between the judge and jury in a mixed common law trial
is that aside from controlling the procedural aspects of the trial, the
judge also gives the jury instructions about the law they are required to
apply. 8 In relation to evidence specifically, the judge is empowered to
admit or exclude evidence and to warn the jury about the weight they
may give admissible but unreliable or potentially unduly prejudicial
evidence. 9 Significantly, if the admissibility of evidence is challenged,
the judge alone, without the presence of the jury, considers the evidence
and its admissibility. If the evidence is excluded the jury is never
exposed to it. Aside from knowing that a matter has been decided out of
their presence, the jury is effectively made unaware of the existence of
the impugned evidence. 10
The prevailing adjudicative process in civil law jurisdictions - paris the "unified" or "mixed"
ticularly for serious criminal charges
bench where professional judges sit along-side a greater number of lay
jurors. 11 Most significantly for evidence law the voir dire, where a judge
has an opportunity to assess and consider the admissibility of impugned
evidence without the presence of the lay jury, does not exist in civil law
jurisdictions. 12
The civilian system has also adopted an inquisitorial, as opposed to
adversarial, approach to adjudication. At trial the presiding judge is
appointed with the task of calling and examining witnesses and presenting the evidence discovered in the investigation by the examining
magistrate. Parties to the litigation may suggest questions for witnesses
to the presiding judge, but their role is minimal. 13

7
See in Canada e.g. R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345 at para. 36. In any case, the fact that the
jury does not give reasons for its verdict makes it practically impossible to ensure that each
juror has reaches their conclusions by the same route.
8 Quigley, supra note 6 at 436-437, 438-439.
9 See e.g. R. v. A. (S.) (1992), 17 C.R. (4th) 233, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 522 (Ont. C.A.) [R. v. A. cited
to C.R.]; R. v. Vetrovec, [1982] I S.C.R. 811.
10
M. Damaska, "Of Hearsay and Its Analogues" (1992), 76 Minn. L. Rev. 425 at 427-428
[Damaska, "Of Hearsay"].
11
Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 510-511
12 Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 510.
13
Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 525.
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In the civil law system the evidence gathered during the investigation is collected in the dossier. The dossier is a documentary record of
the investigation. Indeed, the trial is as much a public presentation of the
content of the dossier, through calling witnesses and having them confinn their statement as recorded in the dossier, as it is about the determination of guilt. This is not to say that the trial is merely for show, but
rather that it reflects less emphasis on the trial as the site where the guilt
of the accused is determined. 14
Another important difference between common law and civilian
systems, with respect to the development of evidentiary rules and practices, is the nature of appellate review. Common law comis show great
deference to the factual findings made at trial. 15 Appeal courts will
generally only consider questions of law, except where the factual
findings of the trial comi are deemed to have been patently unreasonable
or unsupportable by the evidence. 16 While in criminal cases there is
generally a greater degree of appellate review than in other contexts, the
limited scope of this review makes the trial of utmost importance. In
contrast, civilian law appeals provide a trial de nova, and the appellate
court is empowered to reach a different finding of fact than the original
trial courts without deciding the original finding of fact was unreasonable. As well, the trial court is required to provide written justifications
for their findings of fact. This clarifies the evidentiary basis for the
factual findings at trial, which facilitates judicial review of the factual
findings on appeal. 17
The result of these differences is that the common law places a
greater emphasis than civilian law on the trial itself. The importance of
guarding against an improper finding of fact at trial is therefore of
greater significance in the common law, where the opportunity to disturb those findings on review is more limited.

14 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 450; Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note
5 at 544. See also generally Richard J. Terrill, "France" in World Criminal Justice Systems
(Cincinnati: Anderson, 1997).
15
See e.g. R. v. W.(R)., [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122 [R.W.].
16

Ibid.

17

Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 448-449.
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III. THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS BELIEVED TO
IMPEDE THE FACT-FINDING PROCESS

1. Conceptual Differences Governing the Exclusion of Evidence
In common law jurisdictions, the admission of evidence is considered a
discrete subject of law. In contrast, civilian jurisdictions approach the
use of evidence as a procedural matter. These superficial distinctions in
the categorization of the subject of evidentiary rules allude to a more
profound distinction between the approach of the common law system
and the civil law system, particularly with respect to evidentiary barriers
intended to improve fact-finding accuracy.
In the common law world the use of evidence is governed by a
system of formalized rules for admissibility. The trend in many common
law countries in recent years has been to reduce the number and complexity of these rules, or at least supplement them with an alternative
"principled" approach to the exclusion of evidence. 18 Regardless of
whether a strict or flexible rule is applied, the process of determining
admissibility begins with characterizing the evidence based on formal
categories, such as hearsay evidence, character evidence, or evidence of
credibility.
In contrast, civilian law rejects the categorical approach of the
common law, and particularly the creation of absolute, or even presumptive, exclusionary rules. 19 While this contrast between the common law
and civil law makes it seem as though the two systems are simply
incommensurable, the civil law seems to recognize the potential for
certain evidence to dist01i the fact-finding process in much the same
way that the common law system does. Ultimately, however, it deals
with such evidence in different ways. Rather than excluding evidence
which may distort the fact-finding process by way of exclusionary rules,
the structure and function of the civilian courts results in such evidence
not being called. Where it is called, undue reliance on such evidence is
mitigated. It is helpful at this point to examine an example of evidence
which may distort the fact-finding process.
18
See e.g. the discussion of the development of the residual exception to the hearsay rule,
below.
19
Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 514.
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2. Hearsay Evidence
i. Common Law

In the common law world "hearsay" evidence refers to means of proof
which are derivative. It essentially excludes the admission of statements
to prove the facts stated therein unless that statement is made by a
person while giving oral evidence in the same proceeding. 20 The quintessential example is the recitation by an in-court witness of a statement
made by an out-of-court declarant, used to prove the truth of the contents of the declarant's statement. 21 Hearsay also extends to written
statements, as when a document is introduced which provides a written
record of the author's first hand observations ("single hearsay"), or
where a document is introduced which records statements made by a
first-hand observer written by another ("double hearsay").
Both common law and civil law jurisdictions recognize the danger
ofrelying upon derivative means of proof. Roman-canon law, dominant
on the European continent until the l 81h century, provided explicit rules
for the exclusion of many forms of derivative evidence, and exceptions
there from, similar in practice to those which continue to exist in
common law jurisdictions. 22 Notwithstanding these similar legal traditions with respect to derivative proof however, the modern continental
approach is, at least conceptually, quite different from that used in
common law jurisdictions.
As is the case generally in evidence law, the traditional common law
approach to hearsay focussed on the categorical exclusion of derivative
evidence, qualified by numerous exceptions. 23 More recently some common law jurisdictions have moved toward a "principles-based" approach (often called the "residual exception") to the admission of hearsay evidence which does not fit into one of the traditional exceptions. 24
In the United States this has occurred through amendments to the
See C. Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 9th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1999) at 530
[Tapper].
21 The evidence of the original declarant will sometimes be referred to as "primary evidence"
to distinguish it from derivative evidence.
22
Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 434-441 .
23
The traditional approach still dominates in England. See Tapper, supra note 20 c. XIII, XV.
24
England is a notable exception in this regard. See Tapper, supra note 20 at 538.
20
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Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular Rule 807. 25 With the exception
of the notice requirements provided for in the Federal Rules of Evidence, Canadian courts have developed essentially the same principled
approach through the judicial development of the common law. 26 This
approach allows the admission of hearsay evidence where it is considered necessary and the evidence exhibits circumstantial guarantees of
reliability.
McCormick states that the analysis of reliability is very fact specific
but notes the following factors as often relevant: motivation of the
declarant to speak the truth or lie; spontaneity of the statement, including whether leading questions were asked; time lapse between the event
and the statement describing it; whether the statement was under oath;
whether the declarant was cross-examined as to the statement; the
relationship between the declarant and the witness; whether the
declarant subsequently recanted or affirmed the statement; whether the
statement was recorded (particularly videotaped); and whether the
declarant's firsthand knowledge was clearly demonstrated. 27 Canadian
courts have adopted these same factors in their assessment of circumstantial guarantees of reliability. 28 Both jurisdictions also seem to have
excluded the existence of corroborative evidence as a factor showing
reliability, 29 although not all U.S. Courts have been faithful in following
this doctrine. 3° Further, the Supreme Court of Canada's stance on the
issue seems tenuous, given that the Court has specifically relied on
corroborative evidence to show reliability in early residual exception
cases. 31
The effect of the residual exception on hearsay law in some common
law countries should not be underestimated. However, it is equally
important to realize that this trend leaves the categorical exclusion of
hearsay evidence conceptually intact, and admission of hearsay evidence under the principled approach is properly conceived of as an
25

Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § l, 88 Stat. 1948 (1975).
See for e.g., R. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144 [Starr].
27
See J.W. Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence, 5th ed., vol. 2 (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing, 1999) at 345-346 [McKormick on Evidence vol. 2].
28
See e.g. R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 [Khan]; R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915; R. v. B.
(K.G.), [1993] I S.C.R. 740; and especially R. v. A., supra note 9.
29
Jn U.S. see: McKormick on Evidence vol. 2, supra note 27 at 347, citing Idaho v. Wright,
497 U.S. 805 ( 1990). In Canada see Starr, supra note 26 at para. 217.
30
McKormick on Evidence vol. 2, supra note 27 at 347-348.
31
See Khan, supra note 28; and R. v. U. (F.J.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 764.

26
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exception to the hearsay rule: hearsay evidence is still inadmissible
unless it can be shown to conform with the requirements imposed by a
traditional hearsay exception or the principles-based approach.
Numerous reasons are proposed for the existence of the hearsay rule,
and the justifications for its existence change as courts adapt to changing notions of fairness and efficacious truth-finding. Two of the most
commonly cited, traditional justifications are the oath and the ability of
the trier of fact to assess witness credibility by the witness' presence at
trial. 32 Another oft-cited factor is a distrust of a jury's ability to properly
assess hearsay evidence in light of its inherent weaknesses. 33 Other
concerns include the danger of relying upon the ability of an in-court
witness to accurately replicate the statements of an out-of-court
declarant, 34 the possibility of unfair surprise to opposing counsel, who
would not be able to anticipate the evidence that might be given by a
witness, 35 and the potential for abuse of governmental power by allowing the prosecution to rely upon "professional witnesses" (such as
investigating police officers) to present its case. 36
The dominant modern justification for the hearsay rule is that hearsay makes meaningful cross-examination of the witness impossible. As
the in-court witness can only be challenged as to his or her honesty,
capacity for accurate recollection, and proper interpretation of the statements, the opposing party is usually unable to meaningfully impugn the
contents of the statement offered. When hearsay evidence is used, the
opposing party is often unable to meaningfully test the perception,
memory, narration, and sincerity of the declarant. These factors are
considered the four primary dangers of relying upon hearsay evidence. 37
As cross-examination is recognized as a foundational aspect of the
adversarial system and has been famously lauded as the "greatest engine

McKormick on Evidence vol. 2, supra note 27 at 93-95; and discussion in R. v. B. (K.G.),
[1993] I S.C.R. 740.
33 R. Park, "A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform" ( 1987), 86 Mich. L. Rev. 51 at 56
[Park, "Hearsay Reform"].
34
Ibid. at 56.
35 Park, "Hearsay Reform", supra note 33 at 63.
11
· ' Park, "Hearsay Reform", supra note 33 at 65-66.
37 See McKormick on Evidence
vol. 2, supra note 27 at 93. These four dangers were
recognized by E.M. Morgan in his landmark article "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of
the Hearsay Concept" ( 1948) 62 Harvard L. Rev. 177.

32
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ever invented for the discovery of truth," 38 it is considered essential to a
fair trial. 39

ii. Civil Law
In contrast to the common law, civilian jurisdictions have rejected the
categorical approach to exclusion. Instead, the civil law merely expresses a preference for primary evidence over derivative evidence. 40
This preference has been expressed as the equivalent of the "best
evidence rule" in the common law, but extends to all types of evidence. 41
It is perhaps not surprising at first glance that hearsay is not categorically excluded in civilian jurisdictions, considering that civilian law
provides no analogue for cross-examination, and the inability to crossexamine upon hearsay evidence is the dominant justification for the rule
in the common law world. However, even absent concerns about the
inability of opposing counsel to meaningfully cross-examine a hearsay
witness, many of the justifications for the exclusion of derivative evidence are equally applicable in civilian trials as those in the common
law. Indeed, the dangers of using derivative means of proof are recognized in civil law, although the response has been notably different as a
result of a number of factors.
Given that the dangers of derivative evidence are recognized in
civilian trials, the lack of a rule excluding hearsay evidence seems
unusual. However, this can be attributed broadly to the structural and
functional characteristics of civilian criminal courts. These structural
and functional factors can be divided into two main categories: factors
which make categorical exclusion inappropriate or inefficient, and factors which result in either avoidance of derivative evidence by the
tribunal or mitigate its undesirable effects.

38

J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 5 (Boston: Little Brown, 1940) at
32.
39
See e.g. R. v. O.rnlin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 at paras. 157-160.
40
Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 446.
41
Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 517. Interestingly, prior to the widespread
acceptance of Thayer's theory that relevance is the guiding principle behind evidence law in
the common law world it was proposed that a "best evidence rule" should serve this function.
See W. Twining, Rethinking Evidence (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990) at I 88-189.
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One of the most important factors in civilian law which makes a
categorical hearsay rule impractical is the use of a unitary bench. The
unitary bench, where lay jurors and professional judges sit together on
all issues, including the admissibility of evidence, would tend to make
the exclusion of hearsay evidence an artificial construction. The adjudicators would be required to hear the impugned evidence and then rule on
its admissibility. An adverse ruling on admissibility would require the
panel to disregard the evidence, which is considered both impractical
and unrealistic. Moreover, many civilian observers view disregarding
evidence as an indirect imposition of rules for the evaluation of evidence. Such a system was used under the Roman-canon law system, to
much criticism; it was believed to result in mechanistic and unjust
adjudication. To involve a judge otherwise unconnected with the case at
trial, to hear and decide admissibility issues when they arise, is considered inefficient, impractical and ultimately undesirable. 42
Another imp01tant structural difference that makes the categorical
exclusion of hearsay evidence impractical is the importance of the pretrial dossier in the civilian system. Using the common law understanding of derivative evidence, a large part of a pre-trial dossier would
constitute hearsay, yet it is critical that at least the presiding judge be
conversant with its contents to be able to competently call evidence and
examine witnesses. 43 The very nature of the dossier-based system requires that the questioner be exposed to derivative evidence. Once
again, it would be impossible and artificial to suppose that the judge
might read hearsay evidence in the dossier, then disregard that same
evidence if it were deemed inadmissible at trial. 44
Although the structure and function of the civilian trial makes a
categorical hearsay rule impractical, there are a number of facets of the
civilian trial that limit the use of hearsay evidence or mitigate its
undesirable effect. Among the most important of these is the nonpartisan nature of the proceedings, wherein the judiciary controls the
presentation of evidence. A number of results relevant to the admission
of derivative evidence flow from this fact.

Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 445-446.
"Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 450-451.
44
Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 45 I.

·12
4

> Damaska,
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Firstly, judicial control of proceedings means there is less concern
about the partisanship of witnesses. Witnesses are viewed as basically
neutral, rather than as "prosecution witnesses" or "defence witnesses,"
which tends to make the reliability of evidence less suspect. 45 Secondly,
as noted above, witnesses who give inculpatory evidence are not crossexamined by the accused's counsel. As a result, the inability to meaningfully challenge the witness on the accuracy of the derivative statements provided seems less detrimental to trial fairness. 46 Thirdly, the
court is able to call evidence in the manner considered most appropriate,
rather than hearing the presentation of evidence in the order deemed
most desirable by the parties. Admissible derivative evidence may be
followed immediately by testimony of the original declarant, thereby
addressing the concern that derivative evidence may be misunderstood
or given undue weight by a tribunal unaware of the full context of the
declarant's observations. 47
In addition to the judicial control of proceedings, civilian law mitigates against the unrestrained acceptance of hearsay evidence via the
principle of immediacy and the structure and scope of judicial review.
The principle of immediacy, the lesser of these two guards against
derivative means of proof, essentially requires direct contact between
the adjudicators and their sources of information. While to the common
law lawyer, such a requirement may seem to directly import a prohibition of hearsay evidence, the rule is generally not understood so broadly
in civilian law. The rule was introduced to remedy the perceived injustice of the Roman-canon law system, which in its twilight years saw
cases resolved by judges who did not have a direct investigatory role;
instead, they were simply briefed of the relevant evidence by a subordinate. The result was that cases were decided without direct observation
of any of the witnesses by the adjudicator. 48
The rule of immediacy was designed to put an end to these derivative adjudications; therefore it has generally been narrowly interpreted
to prohibit only official bureaucratic mediation of the evidence to the
adjudicator. 49 Nonetheless, the principle of immediacy is sometimes
45

46
47
48
49

Damaska,
Damaska,
Damaska,
Damaska,
Damaska,

"Of Hearsay",
"Of Hearsay",
"Of Hearsay",
"Of Hearsay",
"Of Hearsay",

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

note
note
note
note
note

I0
10
10
10
10

at 431.
at 433.
at 433.
at 446-447.
at 446-447.
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relied on in both academic commentary and courts as requiring the
presentation of primary evidence wherever possible. 50 While the principle continues to be of only subsidiary importance in most civilian
jurisdictions, it is statutorily applied in Italy, where Art. 195 of the
Italian Code of Criminal Procedure contains a prohibition of hearsay
evidence except where strictly necessary. 51 Because of the scope of the
Italian procedural reforms, this anomaly will not be examined in depth
in this paper. It is nonetheless noteworthy that in Italy, the broader
reading of the principle of immediacy as an exclusionary rule has been
adopted to seemingly dramatic effect.
Outside of Italy, the preference for primary evidence is principally
enforced through the structure and functioning of the judicial review
process. Damaska notes that civilian judges are required to provide
reasoned opinions in which they specify their factual findings and the
bases for those findings. 52 As noted above, appellate review is readily
available in criminal cases, and appellate judges show very little deference to factual findings at trial. Appellate courts will overturn trial court
rulings if they consider the evidentiary basis for those findings to be
insufficient. Derivative evidence is a recognized source of such an error
unless the derivative statements are supported by circumstantial guarantees ofreliability, as is the case in some common law countries. 53
Mitigation of hearsay dangers is also achieved through appellate
review because civilian judges are responsible for ensuring a comprehensive and accurate evidentiary record sufficient to prove guilt at
trial. 54 A judge who refuses to call the original declarant (where available) of a statement which provides the only strong evidence of an
important and material fact is likely to be overruled on review. Even in
cases where the declarant is unavailable, convictions have been reversed
where the only evidence conclusive of guilt is derivative and circumstantial guarantees of reliability are too weak to support conviction. 55

50

Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note
Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note
52
Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note
53
Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note
54
Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note
55
Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note
51

I 0 at 447-448,
10 at 447-448,
I 0 at 448.
I 0 at 448-49.
I 0 at 454.
I 0 at 456.

11.
11.

63.
63.
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iii. Common Law and Civil Law in Comparison
The residual exception to the hearsay rule in some common law jurisdictions shows an understandable concern that hearsay evidence should be
both necessary and reliable in order to be admissible. Both common law
and civilian jurisdictions provide their own legal or structural/functional
guarantees in this regard.
With regard to ensuring that hearsay evidence is only given where it
is necessary, both systems offer similar guarantees. In common law
jurisdictions both the rule and its exceptions generally tend to ensure
that derivative evidence is only given when the original declarant is
either absolutely unavailable or cannot reasonably give the relevant
testimony (exceptions to this tendency exist, such as admissions by an
accused). In civilian law the principle that hearsay evidence is only used
where necessary is ensured through the commonsense operation of the
inquisitorial system and the need for reasoned justifications of judgments. In particular, the principle that the examining magistrate is
responsible for ensuring a comprehensive and accurate evidentiary
record ensures that derivative evidence will only be acceptable where
the declarant is unavailable.
In terms of reliability the two systems are more markedly different.
The common law requires a finding by the trial judge of threshold
reliability through circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness before
the evidence goes before the jury, whereas the civilian law offers no
such protections against the admission of unreliable hearsay. However,
while the common law ensures that a basic level of reliability is shown
for hearsay evidence, there are in this area, (as is generally the case in
the common law), no rules guiding the weight to be given such evidence. Subject to the power of a judge to substitute a verdict or an appeal
court to substitute a finding of fact (both of which are unusual and
extraordinary remedies) the jury is free to rely heavily on derivative
evidence if they so choose. The only common guarantee against this is
the warning by the trial judge as to the danger of relying solely upon
derivative evidence.
In civilian systems there is no formal mechanism for excluding
unreliable derivative evidence. Presumably in flagrant cases of
unreliability such evidence would not be elicited by the presiding judge.
But generally, derivative evidence will be admitted regardless of its
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reliability, and it will go unsupported where the declarant is unavailable.
However, the civil law provides more opportunity for appellate review
of factual decisions. The result is that while questionable derivative
evidence is probably more likely to be admitted in civilian jurisdictions,
there is a greater potential for such evidence to be unduly relied upon at
a common law trial. While the judiciary in common law jurisdictions
exercises strong control over the admission of evidence, there is no
significant control over the weight to be given to such evidence. As
such, there appears to be a greater danger that a common law jury will
unduly rely upon hearsay evidence which exhibits only the minimal
threshold reliability, whereas a civilian tribunal would likely face higher
hurdles on review if it based a decision solely or significantly on such
evidence. In terms of the ultimate decision of the tribunal, the civilian
system seems to provide stronger guarantees that derivative evidence
will not be unduly relied upon.

IV. EVIDENTIARY BARRIERS IMPOSED FOR REASONS
EXTRANEOUS TO TRUTH-FINDING

It has been argued above that the exclusionary rules and practices for

evidence excluded purely due to concerns that it will distort fact-finding
are largely a result of the structure and functioning of the criminal
tiibunal. Because such tribunals operate primarily in the same manner
across national boundaries, the primary indicia of variability is the type
of legal system used in a jurisdiction (i.e. common law or civil law). In
contrast, the exclusion of evidence for reasons extraneous to truth
finding reflects a society's prioritization of certain values over accurate
truth finding. Such exclusion is therefore more subject to variance
within a legal tradition than are exclusionary practices that arise out of
concerns about distortion of the fact-finding process.
The category of evidence excluded for reasons extraneous to truthfinding accuracy encompasses a huge range of potential evidentiary
barriers, ranging from the protection of certain communications to the
fruits of illegal state action.
This section will focus on the admission of evidence from illegal
searches and seizures. Unlike other kinds of evidence obtained illegally
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(for example, evidence obtained through involuntary confessions or
deprivation of legal counsel) evidence obtained through illegal search
and seizure can rarely be impugned due to unreliability or because it
would otherwise distort the fact-finding process. As such, it provides a
relatively pure comparator to the type of evidentiary exclusion discussed in the first part of this paper.
For simplicity I will only consider the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence at the formal trial, where the guilt of the accused is
detennined (as opposed to at bail or other proceedings), and only with
respect to evidence obtained illegally in violation of the rights of the
accused (as opposed to the rights of uncharged third parties).
Because the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence differs dramatically across national boundaries, this section will focus on the
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in five countries: England,
Canada, and the United States (from the common law tradition), and
France and Gennany (from the civil law tradition).

1. The Common Law World

The basic legal rights recognized in Canada, the United States and
England are all held in common, and indeed are said to be derived from
the common law tradition. Nonetheless, each country has adopted significantly different approaches to the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence. In each case, the exclusionary rnles adopted reflect different
understandings of the reasons for the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence. These reasons in turn reflect the unique experience of each
nation, particularly in regard to the regulation of the relationship between citizens and the state.
It is noteworthy that in Canada and the United States national
constitutional minimum standards exist for obtaining evidence by
search and seizure. Searches and seizures which fall below these constitutional minimums are obviously illegal. However, in these jurisdictions
a search and seizure can be illegal by virtue of violating another statute
(or state constitution in the U.S.) which sets standards for conducting
searches and seizures higher than those mandated by the federal constitution. Therefore, these jurisdictions potentially have two kinds of illegally obtained evidence from a search and seizure: evidence which is
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obtained in contravention of the constitutional minimum standards, and
evidence which is obtained without violating constitutional standards,
yet is illegal by virtue of violating another rule of law. Hence, there are
potentially two kinds of remedies for addressing such evidence. This
section will focus on the exclusion of evidence which is obtained
illegally by virtue of falling below constitutional minimum standards in
countries where such constitutional minimum standards exist. This
approach is adopted both for simplicity and because the case for the
exclusion of evidence as a result of a constitutionally impermissible
search is obviously more compelling. The justifications for such exclusions are therefore more interesting for comparative purposes.

i. England
The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in England is dealt with
through the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. 56 The treaty has been a guiding force in
English jurisprudence since it came into effect in 1953, and in 1998, it
became incorporated into English domestic law by the Human Rights
Act 1998. 57 Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is also dealt with
under s. 78( 1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 58 That
section reads:
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which
the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court
that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the evidence would have
such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court
ought not to admit it.

Prior to the enactment of s. 78( 1), the English approach was to admit
illegally obtained evidence, subject to exclusion in narrowly defined
circumstances that involved a reference to an inadmissible confession of
guilt, or evidence obtained by an act in contempt of comi. 59

56

4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. T.S. 5 (entered into force 5 September 1953)

[Convent ion].
57
58

(U.K.), 1998, c. 42 [Human Rights Act I 998].
(U.K.), 1984, c. 60.
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As A. L.-T. Choo and S. Nash explain, 60 while the early jurisprudence interpreting s. 78(1) tended towards excluding illegally obtained
evidence, recent decisions suggest that the fact evidence has been
illegally obtained is in most instances insufficient to ensure its exclusion, or even confer discretion on the trial judge to decide whether to
admit the evidence. Choo and Nash point out that while early cases
indicated that "significant and substantial breaches" of the law will
heavily favour exclusion of the evidence obtained even absent bad faith
by the police, recent judgments are concerned only with the reliability of
the illegally obtained evidence in determining whether it is admissible. 61
Choo and Nash point to the Court of Appeal decision in Chalkley62
which suggests that illegally obtained evidence cannot be excluded to
signify judicial disapproval of the way in which it has been obtained.
The judgment suggests that the only basis for exclusion of such evidence is unreliability. 63 Choo and Nash remark that Chalkley is by no
means unique, noting that the Court's approach is similar to that of the
Court of Appeal in an earlier decision: Cooke. 64 In that case the Court
held that, arguendo, even if impugned evidence is deemed to be illegally
obtained, if the illegality does not cast doubt on the reliability of that
evidence it is not subject to exclusion. In its ruling the Court distinguished illegally obtained real evidence from illegally obtained confessions which, it was suggested, were ripe for exclusion because of
concerns about reliability. 65
Of particular significance in the English context is the movement
away from the discretionary exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
that the decision in Chalkley reflects. In a decision prior to Chalkley, the
House of Lords in Khan (Sultan)6 6 suggested that exclusion of evidence
pursuant to s. 78(1) might be engaged at the discretion of the trial judge

59

Tapper, supra note 20 at 500-501.
A. L.-T. Choo and S. Nash, "The Exclusion of Improperly Obtained Evidence in England
and Wales: a Continuing Saga" in C.M. Breur et. al. eds., Neiv Trends· in Criminal Investigation and Evidence (Oxford: lntersentia, 2000) at 127-140 [Choo & Nash].
61
Ibid. at 128-129. 132-134.
62
[J 998] 2 All. E.R. 155.
63
Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 132-133.
64
[1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 318.
65
Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 132.
66
[1996] All E.R. 289.
60
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when a breach of the Convention had been established. 67 In contrast to
the House of Lords decision in Khan (Sultan), which still only conferred
narrow and discretionary exclusion power to trial judges, the decision in
Chalkley suggests that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is impermissible unless the reliability of that evidence is undermined. In any
event, as Choo and Nash note, both cases clearly reflect the commitment
of the English judiciary to reliability as the chief indicia of admissibility
for illegally obtained evidence. 68
To explain this narrow approach to s. 78(1 ), Choo and Nash observe
that the English judiciary has approached the protection of trial fairness
in s. 78(1) as a guarantee of procedural fairness for the accused in the
case at bar, as opposed to a broader approach of protecting the fairness
of the trial for the accused qua representative citizen. 69 The English
judiciary's concerns about fairness in determining the admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence extend no further than protecting the accused against wrongful conviction from the admission of unreliable,
illegally obtained evidence. This is in contrast to Canadian and American courts, which have (at least in part) deemed the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence to be a reflection of the extent of the
judiciary's commitment to the protection of the legal rights of all
residents and the integrity of the administration of justice.
English law seems to have adopted reliability as the only factor
relevant to deciding the admissibility of evidence under s. 78(1 ). This
trend could be reversed or altered by the adoption of the Convention into
domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. 70 The effect of this Act is
still uncertain as it did not come fully into force until October, 2000.
However, it seems unlikely that the Convention will significantly alter
the state of the English law surrounding the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence. There are three reasons for this.
Firstly, the Convention has been a guiding force in the development
of domestic English law since it came into force as an international
treaty in 1953. It was already considered by the courts when they

Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 134-135.
Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 135. This is the same approach that was adopted in Canada
under the prior to the introduction of the Charter, infra note 74. See. R. v. Wray, inji-a note 73.
69 Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 139-140.
70
Human Rights Act 1998. supra note 57.

67

68
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developed the current approach to s. 78(1). 71 Secondly, recent criminal
jurisprudence suggests that the adoption of the Convention into domestic law is not generating any dramatic effects with regard to the interpretation of legal rights in other areas of criminal law. 72 Thirdly, the
Convention does not speak directly to the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence, and it seems unlikely to substantially affect the treatment of
illegally obtained evidence where s. 78(1) (which has provided an
obvious opportunity for the judiciary to change the traditional approach
of the common law to illegally obtained evidence) has not. Nonetheless,
with the adoption of the Convention into domestic law the potential for
change arises, and it still remains to be seen whether the judiciary will
use this opportunity to adopt a different exclusionary rule.

ii. Canada

The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in Canada draws from
relatively recent constitutional provisions enacted in 1982. Prior to
1982, reliability was the guiding indicia of admissibility. 73 Now the
exclusion or admission of such evidence occurs through the operation of
s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 74 which forms
part of Canada's constitution. That section reads:
Where ... a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner
that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having
regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

With respect to evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure, the
most relevant Charter guarantee is the protection afforded by s.8, which
provides that"[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure."
See above.
See A. Norrie, "Criminal Justice, Judicial Interpretation, Legal Rights: On Being Sceptical
about the Human Rights Act 1998" in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing, and A. Tomkins eds.,
Sceptical Essays in Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 261.
73
R. v. Wray, (1971] S.C.R. 272.
74
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982,
c. 11 [Charter].
71

72
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The provisions of s. 24(2) are sometimes described as a "discretionary" exclusionary rule. 75 This characterization is incorrect. Notwithstanding the deference appellate courts have shown towards the application of s. 24(2) at trial, 76 the effect of s. 24(2) is to mandate the exclusion
of evidence in certain cases. 77 It is therefore distinguishable from truly
discretionary remedies.
The leading case on s. 24(2) is R. v. Stillman. 78 In that case the
Supreme Court of Canada recognized three categories of factors relevant to detennining if the admission of evidence obtained in violation
of the Charter would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: i)
factors relating to the fairness of the trial, ii) the seriousness of the
Charter violation, and iii) the disrepute to the administration of justice
by excluding the improperly obtained evidence. 79 In practice, the first
factor and the last two are examined disjunctively. "Trial fairness" is
one basis for exclusion, and showing that the seriousness of the breach
outweighs the disrepute to the administration of justice brought on by
exclusion is another. In either case, the onus is on the accused to show
on a balance of probabilities that obtaining the evidence resulted in a
Charter breach, and further, to prove that exclusion is warranted under
s. 24(2). 80
Courts have held that where the fairness of the trial is impugned by
the admission of improperly obtained evidence, to admit the evidence
would always cause the administration of justice to be brought into
disrepute; therefore, such evidence should be excluded. 81 As such, a
finding that admission would result in an unfair trial is always fatal to
the prosecution's attempt to admit the evidence.
Trial unfairness, however, is only established where the violative
evidence in question is conscriptive. 82 Admissions obtained from the
75

See e.g. J. Stribopoulos, "Lessons from the Pupil: A Canadian Solution to the American
Exclusionary
Rule Debate" (1999), 22 Boston College Int'! & Comp. L. Rev. 77 [Stribopoulos, "Lessons"].
76
See e.g. R. v. Dugay, [1989] S.C.R. 93 at 98, cited with approval in R. v. Stillman, [1997]
S.C.R. 607 [Stillman].
77
Paciocco, D.M. and L. Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999) at
207 [Pacciocco & Stuesser].
78
Stillman, supra note 76.
79
Stillman supra note 76 at para. 69.
80
Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 205.
81
Stillman, supra note 76 at para. 72.
82
Stillman, supra note 76 at para. 72; R. v. Silveira, [1995] S.C.R. 297 at para. 146.
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accused in violation of the Charter obviously fall into this category. The
Court determined in Stillman that conscriptive evidence also includes
evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure that
uses the body83 or results in the taking of bodily samples. 84 Other
evidence obtained by search and seizure can also be excluded as
conscriptive where it is derivative of the conscriptive evidence, i.e. it is
discovered only as a result of other unconstitutionally obtained
conscriptive evidence. 85 The only major exception to this rule is that
conscriptive evidence (including, most significantly, derivative evidence) is still subject to admission if it is proven by the Crown on a
balance of probabilities to have been discoverable. 86
The principle behind the "trial fairness" branch of the test under s.
24(2) is that a fair trial requires the Crown to prove its case against the
accused. The use of illegal conscriptive evidence violates the principle
of fundamental justice that an accused should not be compelled to give
evidence against him or herself. 87
The remaining two steps of the test are best understood in conjunction. The seriousness of the Charter breach considers the conduct of the
authorities. 88 It essentially analyses police conduct resulting in the violation on a spectrum ranging from "good faith" to "blatant disregard for
the accused's rights." A serious or flagrant violation would tend to
recommend against admission because it would constitute judicial condonation of improper police practices. 89 Other relevant factors include
For example, taking casts of a persons body: see Stillman, supra note 76.
Stillman, supra note 76 at paras. 80-98; conscriptive evidence was limited to these three
categories in R. v. Lewis (1998), 13 C.R. (5th) 34, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v.
Davies (1998), 18 C.R. (5th) I 13, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Y.T. C.A.).
85 Stillman, supra note 76 at para. 99; R. v. Burlingham (1997), 38 C.R. (4th) 265
[Burlingham]. For example, in Burlingham a shotgun which was seized from the bottom of a
river as a result of the accused's improperly obtained confession was deemed derivative of the
confession, and therefore conscriptive for the purposes of analyzing trial fairness. The shotgun
was not otherwise discoverable, and was therefore excluded from the trial.
86 Stillman, supra note 76 at paras. I 02, 107.
87 See R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 15 I; and supra note 75 at 219-220, the protection of the
accused from imprisonment as a result of state action which violate principles of fundamental
justice is guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter (supra note 68) which reads: "Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."
88 Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 124; Collins v. R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 56 C.R.
(3d) 193 [Collins].
89
Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 124.
83
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whether the breach was serious or "merely technical" and whether the
breach was motivated by urgency or necessity, both of which will
mitigate the seriousness of the breach. 90
The final step weighs the seriousness of the Charter violation
against the effects exclusion would have on the reputation of the administration of justice. This analysis is premised on the perspective of an
objective, reasonable person, and it is not intended to import the unreasonable or reactionary views of the public to the exclusion of probative
evidence, no matter how widely held. 91 It is intended to consider the
effect of the admission of evidence of the type in question generally, not
just in the instant circumstance. 92 It is recognized by the Court that the
more serious the offence, and the more crucial the evidence to the
Crown's case, the greater the possibility of disrepute from exclusion, 93
although examples exist of very important, reliable evidence being
excluded for prosecutions of extremely serious crimes where the police
violation has been significant. 94
Interestingly, unlike the analysis under the "trial fairness" step or the
prevailing law in the US, where the evidence impugned pursuant to s.
24(2) was discoverable by other (non-violative) means, this will often
weigh in favour of exclusion, because it shows the police violation was
unnecessary, yet it was chosen when less violative means were available.95 Paciocco and Stuesser try to reconcile the conflicting responses
to the discoverability of the impugned evidence in the two stages of s.
24(2) analysis by suggesting it will mitigate against admission where
the violation occurs under circumstances when the officers knew or
should have known of the constitutionally permissible means. It will
mitigate in favour of admission where such means were not apparently
available. 96
The fact that the basis for the exclusionary rule is explicitly spelled
out in Canada makes discovering the intended effect of the exclusionary
Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 229
Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 126.
92
Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 125.
93
Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 237.
94
Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 237; see e.g. Stillman, supra note 76; R. v. Feeney,
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 13; and Burlingham, supra note 85.
95
Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 124-125; Collins, supra note 88 at 285, cited with
approval in Stillman, supra note 76 at para. l 05.
96
Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 235.
90
91
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rule both easier and harder. On the one hand, its purpose is clearly to
ensure the reputation of the administration of justice. On the other hand,
the measures necessary to ensure the good repute of the administration
of justice are by no means clear; absent judicial interpretation such
measures admit virtually any interpretation. That the judiciary in
Canada can rely upon the wording of s. 24(2) to justify their decisions
tends to veil their underlying intentions in applying the section, rather
than revealing them.
Aside from avoiding disrepute to the administration of justice, the
most obvious purpose of s. 24(2), as it has been interpreted, is to ensure
a fair trial. This is consistent with the explicit provision of s. 11 (d) of the
Charter which constitutionally mandates a fair trial by an independent
and impartial tribunal. 97
Most interestingly, s. 24(2) jurisprudence also demonstrates an underlying concern for deterring police misconduct, although this rationale is less clearly stated. This is indicated by judicial concern for the
mental state of the violating state authorities (i.e. good or bad faith).
While it has been suggested that the mental state of the law enforcement
authorities who obtain the violative evidence is significant under s.
24(2) analysis because it would constitute judicial condonation of the
improper police practices, 98 this is clearly not the complete story. This
point was brought to the fore by Iacobucci J. 's comments in R. v.
Burlingham: 99
... we should never lose sight of the fact that even a person accused of
the most heinous crimes, and no matter the likelihood that he or she
actually committed those crimes, is entitled to the full protection of the
Charter. Short-cutting or short-circuiting those rights affects not only
the accused but also the entire reputation of the criminal justice
system. It must be emphasized that the goals ofpreserving the integrity of the criminal justice system as well as promoting the decency of
investigatOJy techniques are ofjimdamental importance in applying s.
24(2).100

While the Canadian approach to the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence has been lauded for striking a compromise between the
97

Charter, supra note 74.
Stribopoulos, '"Lessons, supra note 75 at 124.
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Burlingham, supra note 85.
100
Burlingham, supra note 85 at para. 50 [emphasis added].
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extreme positions taken on the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence in other common law countries, its judicial interpretation lacks
the kind of precision that would allow for more predictable and consistent application. Clearly, s. 24(2) can never be used to create an absolute
exclusionary rule; it necessarily imports a proportionality analysis.
However, by developing more explicitly the competing reasons behind
the rule such as balancing deterrence of police misconduct with the
public's interest in seeing reliable evidence admitted - the Court would
go a long way towards providing guidance to lawyers and law enforcement. Moreover, to the extent that deterring police misconduct is a
relevant factor, it would undoubtedly be beneficial to make this factor
more explicit. It remains to be seen whether Canada will develop an
approach to s. 24(2) which brings more tangible concerns than the
reputation of the administration of justice to the fore.

iii. United States

The Fourth Amendment to the United States' Constitution provides
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures and sets out the
minimum requirements for granting a search warrant. IOI The requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply to prosecutions at both the state
and federal level, although states are free to provide for more expansive
search and seizure protections in their own constitutions. Io2 The appropriate remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment is the exclusion
of the evidence from the trial, subject to a few limited exceptions. Io3
Generally, the onus is on the defendant to show a violation of the Fourth
Amendment and a factual connection to the impugned evidence, on a
balance of probabilities. The prosecution must then establish an applicable exception to the exclusionary rule. Io4
Notwithstanding that the Fourth Amendment was enacted in 1791,
the general exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
101

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
McCormick on Evidence vol. I, supra note 4 at 591.
103
McCormick 011 Evidence vol. I, supra note 4 at 586-588.
104
A higher burden may be placed on the prosecution in certain cases or by state law: J.W.
Strong ed., McCormick on Evidence, 5'11 ed., vol. I (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, J 992) at
765-767 [McCormick 011 Evidence vol. I ( 1992)].
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Amendment is a relatively recent phenomenon in the United States. It is
only since the early 20111 century that the remedy of exclusion has been
mandated for prosecutions by the federal government, and not until
1961 did the United States Supreme Court determine that state prosecutions are bound by the same exclusionary rule when the Fourth Amendment is violated. 105
The broad exclusionary rule used to remedy Fourth Amendment
violations in the United States has been implemented because of the
"obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection
of other mechanisms." 106 Yet this does not explain the ultimate purpose
of the rule, i.e. how the protections of the Fourth Amendment are to be
applied.
Since its inception in the early 2Qth century the primary purpose of
the exclusionary rule in the United States has been to deter police
officers from engaging in illegal conduct. In practice, to a lesser extent,
the exclusionary rule also serves an educative function in teaching
police about the seriousness with which society protects legal rights in
the hopes of subtly influencing the value systems and practices of law
enforcement. 107 The deterrence rationale was expressly recognized in
United States v. Calandra 108 and in subsequent decisions. 109 This underlying purpose is illustrated in the interpretation of the exclusionary rule
and the exceptions to it.
The rationale of deterring illegal police conduct finds practical
manifestation in the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. This rule
excludes any evidence which is obtained as a factual consequence of a
Fourth Amendment violation. 110 In the past this doctrine has been ap-

McCormick on Evidence vol. l, supra note 4 at 585-587; for federal application see Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (I 920); for state application see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 ). Note that the general
exclusionary rule necessarily applies only where a violation of the federal constitution is made
out; the exclusionary remedy is not mandated by the United States' Constitution where only a
state constitution which provides for more expansive protections than the Fourth Amendment
is violated: see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
106
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1961) at 652 cited in supra note 4 at 587 § 166,
107
W.R. Lafave et. al., Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, vol. I (St.
Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co., 1987) at 16.
108
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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plied liberally. For example, in Murray v. United States 111 the United
States Supreme Court held that even if there exists sufficient evidence
prior to an illegal search and seizure to show cause for a warrant, where
the decision to engage in the subsequent legal search has been influenced by the prior illegal search, the fruits of both will be excluded. 112
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to limit the extent
of this doctrine. In particular, the Court has rejected a strict "but for"
doctrine in determining whether a constitutional violation results in the
collection of evidence. In New York v. Harris 113 the comt allowed the
admission of a statement made by an accused where the accused had
been arrested in his home without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. It was not contested that the arrest was legal and the police
had probable cause for the arrest and grounds for a warrant. The Court
allowed the admission of the statement on the grounds that, while it was
the factual consequence of illegal police actions, it was not the product
of the illegality. 114
Although the full implications of Harris are not yet clear, the
"fruits" doctrine still appears to be intact in the case of most Fourth
Amendment violations. 115 Regardless of the exact extent of the doctrine,
its existence is testament to the deterrence rationale; it serves to dissuade desperate law enforcement officers from engaging in illegal
searches in the hopes that, while the products of that search will be
excluded, the illegal evidence obtained may lead to other sources of
information, which can be legally exploited.
The deterrence rationale also explains one of the important exceptions to the application of the exclusionary rule: the "inevitable discovery" doctrine. That doctrine holds that, notwithstanding a causal link
between a Fourth Amendment violation and the evidence obtained,
illegally obtained evidence will be admissible if the prosecution can
show that the evidence would inevitably have been found, absent the
illegal search. 116 In keeping with the rationale behind the exclusionary
rule, some courts have ruled it inapplicable in certain cases where it
487 u .s. 533 (l 988).
McCormick on Evidence - vol. 1 ( 1992), supra note 104 at 722.
113
495 U.S. 14 (1990).
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would undermine the justification for the exception. For example, in
cases where wan-ants are carried out without proper announcement, the
illegally obtained evidence would almost always have inevitably been
discovered if the warrant had been properly performed. Yet the desire to
deter illegal conduct would be undermined by allowing the admission of
the evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine, as it would not
deter the police from using illegal means. 117
Taken to its logical extension, the rationale of deterring police
misconduct would sometimes allow the admission of illegally obtained
evidence which was believed by the police to be obtained legally. This
forms the basis for the most controversial of the exceptions to exclusion:
the "good faith" doctrine. The reasoning behind this exception is that
exclusion serves no deten-ent function where the police reasonably
believe in the legality of their search. 118 The doctrine is misleading
because the mistake as to the legality of their actions only has to be
reasonable, not subjectively in "good faith." 119 The reasoning has been
applied to cases where the police rely on a defective warrant 120 or an
unconstitutional statute. 121 It appears that this exception only applies
where the police rely upon an outside authority, such as a search warrant
or statute, but not to other violative searches undertaken in objective
"good faith." This reflects the fact that the deterrence rationale would be
undennined by too broad a "good faith" exception which encompassed
any reasonable mistake of law as to the constitutionality of a violative
search (for example, for a search following a "good faith" illegal detention).122

Another interesting exception to the exclusionary rule is the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence for the purposes of impeaching the
testimony of the defendant. 123 Where the defendant chooses to take the
stand and gives testimony inconsistent with the illegally obtained eviMcCormick on Evidence vol. I (1992), supra note I 04 at 744; State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459,
724 P.2d 545 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1986)
118 McCormick on Evidence
vol. I, supra note 4 at 628-631; United States v. Leon (1984),
468 U.S. 897 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
119
McCormick 011 Evidence vol. l, supra note 4 at 628.
120
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
121
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
122 McCormick on Evidence - vol. l, supra note 4 at 630-634; State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181
(Utah Sup. Ct. 1987).
123
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dence, the prosecution is entitled to challenge the assertions of the
defendant by introducing the illegally obtained evidence. While this
exception only arises where the defendant testifies 124 on a matter which
is contradicted by the illegally obtained evidence, statements made in
cross-examination are subject to contradiction under this exception, so
long as the questioning is within the scope of the defendant's direct
examination. 125
The rationale for this exception is that the secondary use of illegal
evidence is unlikely to reduce the deterrent effect of the general exclusionary rule. 126 Also, this exception is considered to support an important value which counters the value of deterring illegal police conduct;
that is, perjmy is an offence against the administration of justice, and the
courts should not sanction the use of perjury as a defence against
criminal charges. 127 A final important limitation on this exception is
reliability. McCormick observes that evidence admitted under this exception is allowed because it is highly probative to determining the
accuracy of the defendant's version of events. When the illegality at
issue threatens the reliability of the evidence, it will not necessarily be
permissible to use the illegally obtained evidence to impeach the defendant.128
A recent exception to the exclusionary rule that has developed
occurs where there is an intervening illegal act by the accused. 129 This
arose in a Fourth Amendment context in Holmes v. State 130 where the
suspect's car was illegally searched. In response to the illegal search the
suspect grabbed the contraband and placed it in his mouth. The evidence
was admitted to prove the accused's possession of the contraband both
before and after the illegal act because of the suspect's criminal effort to
124
The Supreme Court of the United States in a 5-4 decision in James v. ll!inois, 493 U.S. 307
(1990) narrowly decided against extending the impeachment exception to allow the prosecution to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach any defence witness who provides testimony
contradicted by the impugned evidence.
125
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McCormick on Evidence - vol. I (1992), supra note 104 at 757.
127
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destroy the evidence. 131 This decision may reflect a serious weakening
of the exclusionary rule, although its full impact remains unclear.
The final exception to the exclusionary rule essentially imposes a
limitation on the applicability of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." It is
said that in certain cases the taint from an illegal search becomes
sufficiently attenuated that the impugned evidence becomes admissible.132 It is important to note that, unlike the inevitable discovery
exception, this exception is not premised on challenging the causal link
between the impugned evidence and the constitutional breach. Although
the distinction between attenuation of taint and arguments of no causal
link between the impugned evidence and the illegal search is often
confused, McCormick states that these are clearly two different analyses. 133
On its face, the attenuation of taint doctrine is probably the most
philosophically unjustifiable exception to the exclusionary rule, given
the underlying deterrence rationale. In the context of evidence obtained
illegally from searches, the attenuation of taint doctrine, in particular,
would seem to undennine the purpose of the exclusionary rule. The
existence of this exception is perhaps more understandable when it is
considered that most cases invoking this exception involve confessions
following illegal arrests, where the conduct of the accused some time
after the wrongful police action is seen to interrupt the causal chain of
events which follows from the illegal detention. 134
This exception is perhaps most significant in the context of Fourth
Amendment violations in that it reveals the limits of the exclusionary
rule. It seems to recognize that as the illegal police action becomes more
and more remote from the impugned evidence, the balance between
accurate fact-finding and deterring police conduct begins to shift towards allowing admission. While theoretically interesting, the use of
this rule is still problematic, and its application to Fourth Amendment
violations is uncertain.
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2. Civilian Jurisdictions
In civilian jurisdictions the major structural barrier to the exclusion of
evidence from a search and seizure is the unitary judicial structure,
(discussed above), which would require both professional judges and
lay jurors to disregard highly probative, illegally obtained evidence.
Notwithstanding the significance attributed to this factor in mitigating
against categorical exclusionary rules in the context of evidence excluded because it is believed it would tend to impede the fact-finding
process, this does not seem to be a major factor in determining the
admissibility of search and seizure evidence. Contrary to the assertions
of a large body of Anglo-American scholarship, exclusionary rules are
enforced in Continental Europe in some cases with interesting variations in both their f01m and applicability.

i. Germany

The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a relatively recent development in Gennany. Unlike France, Germany did not have a doctrine of
nullity which might allow the exclusion of such evidence. 135 In fact, the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in Germany dates from the
1950s. 136 However, German law has only recently been clarified, such
that Pakter's article from 1985 is still somewhat speculative when it
notes that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence seems to be the
law in Germany. 137
As a result of its recent development, the German exclusionary rule
owes much to the American model. The operations of the rule in
Germany and the U.S. share many superficial similarities: both are said
to apply an exclusionary rule, a "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine,
135 Walter Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany and Italy" (1985), 9 Hastings Int'!
and
Comp. L. Rev. 1 at 17 [Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules"].
136
Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 17-20.
137
Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 48; compare with M.C.D. Embregts,
"Similarities and Differences: the Operation of the Exclusionary Rule in the US, Germany and
the Netherlands" in C.M. Breur et. al., eds., New Trends in Criminal Investigation and
Evidence, (Oxford: lntersentia, 2000) at 219 [Embregts, "Operations"].
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and an "attenuation of taint" rule. 138 However, notwithstanding these
broad similarities, there are some observable differences which point to
both different purposes for the rules and different conceptions of the
nature of infringement. 139
One major difference is that Germany essentially has two separate
rules for exclusion: evidence obtained by brutality or deceit, and evidence excluded to preserve judicial integrity and rule of law. 140 Evidence which is obtained under the fonner category is summarily excluded, without regard to its probative value. However, the force of this
exclusionary rule is tempered by the fact that the legality of a search and
of a seizure is detennined separately, i.e. an illegal search does not
necessarily make a seizure following that search illegal. 141 The result is
that the apparently robust exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by
brutality or deceit is of limited use. 142 Interestingly, the odd application
of this exclusionaiy rule may be tied to the purpose behind it: it is
intended to preserve judicial integrity rather than deter the police. 143 The
result seems to be that even the merely technical distinction between the
fruits of a search and a seizure allows a sufficient divide that the
judiciary can admit the evidence without compromising the integrity of
the judiciary, notwithstanding that the rule obviously has very little
deterrent effect.
Evidence excluded to preserve judicial integrity and the rule of law
is very different from that excluded under the former category. It is
concerned with protecting the privacy rights of citizens and balancing
those rights against the goal that law enforcement be able to effectively
prosecute crime. Unlike other jurisdictions, exclusion under this rule is
not premised upon illegality. 144 The emphasis under this type of exclusion is protecting the constitutionally entrenched principles of invioEmbregts, "Operations", supra note 137 at 219-220.
While this paper is decidedly not concerned with examining what makes a search illegal or
unconstitutional in the various jurisdictions, in this case the difference is significant to the
operation of exclusionary rule. The reader must tolerate this methodological deviation to
properly understand the operation of the German rule.
14
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lable human dignity (Art. 1), free development of personality (art. 2),
and the inviolability of the home (Art. 13). 145
Unlike the American approach, where the emphasis in determining
admissibility is on the means of procuring the evidence, the Germans
recognize a class of evidence which is inadmissible both because of the
means necessary to obtain it and its content; indeed, it would appear that
these fields merge in this class of evidence. This type of evidence is
labelled "unobtainable", and it arises where the privacy right of the
individual outweighs the interest of the state in its seizure. 146
In analyzing allegedly unobtainable evidence there are three categories: truly unobtainable evidence, evidence subject to balancing with
state interests, and evidence with no protection. Truly unobtainable
evidence is absolutely protected, and not subject to balancing with other
compelling interests. 147 In one case, an accidentally taped phone conversation between a husband and wife was excluded when their legally
tapped phone was inadvertently left off the hook and recorded their
private conversation. 148
The second type of unobtainable evidence requires the balancing of
state interest against individual privacy interests. For example a diary
given to police by a private citizen was excluded because the state
interest was not sufficient to outweigh the individual's privacy rights
under Arts. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 149 The Court held that the
balancing would likely have come out the other way if the diary had
recorded the felonies of a criminal or a foreign agent's diary entries
concerning his spying activities. 150
The final class of evidence receives no protection. It arises in cases
where there is no individual privacy interest under the constitution. This
arises, for example, in cases of business records. 151
The significance of this exclusionary rule is that it provides a strong
process for protecting privacy rights. Rather than focussing on the
government agent, German law very strongly recognizes privacy rights
Cited in Bradley, ·'Germany", supra note 140 at 1037.
Bradley, "Germany"', supra note 140 at 1041-1042.
147
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as the rights of the individual, deserving of protection regardless of th(
means of infringement. While the German model does not provide
robust protections against illegal police action as some other jurisdictions, it does provide much stronger protections of personal privacy
where the impugned evidence would undermine the integrity and
personhood of the individual whose possessions have been seized.

ii. France

France has perhaps the oldest exclusionary doctrine of any of the
countries surveyed here. The sanctity of the domicile is an important
protection in French law, and has been subject to legal protection since
at least the French Revolution. 152 The exclusion of evidence obtained
through illegal searches of a domicile - termed nullification occurred
as early as 1910, and perhaps even earlier. 153
Since 1953, nullification has been the standard response to searches
performed with insufficient warrants, and confessions which were made
as a result of evidence obtained through an illegal search have also been
subject to exclusion under a strong derivative evidence or "fruit of the
poisonous tree" rule. 154 While nullification is used to exclude illegally
obtained evidence, it is noteworthy that exclusion is apparently discretionary, 155 seemingly based on balancing "public policy and the good
administration of justice" against the "rights of the defence." 156
For a time there was suspicion that the flagrant delit provision of the
Code of Criminal Procedure had obviated the need for warrants in
searches of domiciles where the crime was "flagrant". However, the
Court of Cassation held in 1980 that a warrant is always required to
search a domicile, notwithstanding the presence of significant presearch or post-search evidence or "hot pursuit" by the police. 157 "Good
faith" by the police has not been considered an important factor in
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rnsessing the legality of a search or the admissibility of the fruits of that
;earch. 158
Notwithstanding this apparently strong exclusionary rule, the exclu:>ion of illegally obtained evidence in France is rare. One possible reason
for this rarity is that the unitary judicial structure brings to the fore the
iifficulty of asking the criminal tribunal to disregard reliable and compelling evidence of guilt. 159 A more obvious reason is that illegal
:;earches are exceedingly uncommon. While the police require a valid
warrant to conduct a search, the police are allowed to use blank warrants
which do not specify the name of the person or place to be searched. 160
As a result, the warrant requirement places only the smallest technical
obligation on the police to secure prior judicial authorization for a
search.
The apparent lack of development of the law in France for the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence suggests that these violations
are either rarely brought to light - which seems unlikely given the
apparently sturdy exclusionary rule in force
or rarely committed,
which seems more likely given the minimal technical requirements for
obtaining a warrant to justify a search.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The exclusion of relevant evidence occurs in dramatically different
contexts depending on whether the evidence is excluded because of
concerns that it will distort the fact-finding process or because it is
excluded for reasons extraneous to fact-finding. The exclusion of evidence in the former categ01y is a defining characteristic of the common
law system. It is easy for the common law lawyer to cite the apparently
unrestrained admissibility of such evidence in civil law jurisdictions as a
source of the superi01ity of the common law method over the civilian
method. However, such a view is narrow in that it fails to consider the
functional and structural differences in civilian trials which mitigate
Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 37.
Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 524.
160
Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 35.
158
159
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against the use or reliance on such evidence. In this respect, while the
difference between the common law and civilian approaches to the
exclusion of this type of evidence should not be understated, the effect
on the fairness of the proceedings can easily be overestimated. The
example used in this paper, the use of hearsay or derivative evidence,
illustrates that while substantive differences certainly do exist between
the civilian and common law jurisdictions, similar goals are often accomplished by different means. This is undoubtedly an important lesson
for any researcher involved in comparative legal scholarship.
In the context of evidence excluded for reasons extraneous to truth
finding it is interesting how unimportant the civil law/common law
distinction is. Differences in this type of exclusion are closely attributable to the policy goals of the judiciary and legislature and the
judiciary's assigned role, or perception of that role, in enforcing those
policies. Fundamentally, these exclusions reflect the recognition of
policy values with priority over accurate truth finding. The variance
across national boundaries is perhaps then not surprising, nor is the lack
of correlation between the type of legal system used and the exclusionary rules that exist. This type of exclusion reflects the relevance of
national variation, even within a legal system (i.e. common law or civil
law) and reflects the possibility of looking outside one's own legal
system for guidance on the development of exclusions geared towards
policies extraneous to truth-finding.

